Indigenous Land Tenure, Labor and Political Leverage in Neocolonial Latin America 1870-1930

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Chronology

1870: Cruzob intensify resistance in the Yucatan
   The Aymara besiege La Paz and overthrow President Melgarejo

1871: Justo Rufino Barrios takes power in Guatemala, focuses on coffee exports

1877: Guatemala’s new Agrarian Law divides up communal Indigenous lands

1870s: Rubber War in Panama between Blacks, mestizos and Kuna

1875: Argentines begin to dig a trench to exclude Indigenous people

1876: Porfirio Díaz becomes the president of Mexico

1879: Argentine Conquest of the Wilderness exterminates the Tehuelche and Araucaninas
   War of the Pacific begins between Chile against Peru and Bolivia

1880: Tarahumara, allied with Porfirio Díaz, defeat Apache
   Yoeme begin war against Díaz regime and Mexican Army

1881: “Pacification” of Araucania in Chile

1883: General Victorica defeats Q’om resistance in Argentina

1885: Kichwa fight for Liberal leader Eloy Alfaro in Ecuador

1889: Clorinda Matto de Turner publishes Birds without a Nest in Peru

1892: Chiriguano rebellion in Bolivia under Tumpa repressed with savagery

1894: Nicaragua invades Native territories along Atlantic coast

1897: General Lorenzo Winter crushes Qom and Mocobi resistance in Argentine Chaco

1901: Mexico defeats Cruzob army at Chan Santa Cruz in Yucatan

1903: Panama declares its independence from Colombia

1906: Sam Pitts declares himself Miskitu King in Nicaragua

1907: Peruvian Amazon Company registered in London to harvest caucho in Peru
1909: Opposition politician Francisco Madero demands end of Díaz Regime in Mexico
1910: Brazil creates Service for Indigenous Protection
1911: Armed Indigenous people attack landowners throughout Mexico as Revolution begins
1912: President Madero recruits Yoeme, Mayos, Pimas and Pápagos in Sonora to fight rebels
1913: Adventists open bible school on Nargana Island, Panama, for Kuna children
   Forced conscription of Indigenous people into Mexican army
   Concha Rebellion in Ecuador; Indigenous people fight on both sides
1916: Yoeme guerrilla sorties against Mexico
1917: Mexico defeats Yoeme rebels at Cerro del Gallo
   Pilagá warriors attack Fort Yunká in Formosa, Argentina
1920: Peru’s new constitution adopts indigenista stance to protect Native people
1924: Massacre of forty Mocobí at Napa’lpi in Chaco Province, Argentina
1925: Kuna rebellion in Panama; Manuel Quintín Lame organizes Nasa people in Colombia
1927: Aymara Rebellion in Chayanta, Bolivia
1929: Miskitu and other Indigenous people in Nicaragua support Sandino’s opposition to U.S. Marine occupation

Introduction: Neocolonialism Challenges Indigenous Communities

As Liberals gained power throughout Latin America by the 1870s, their plans to create law and order challenged Indigenous communities. Like Conservatives, Liberal rulers intended to exclude Native people from political rule and the benefits of development, though they did this in a more heavy-handed way. By breaking up communal Native territories, Liberals undermined Indigenous societies and made a lot of land available for their own use. Because differences between Indigenous peoples still ran deep, it was not difficult for the upper classes to divide Natives to make their own rule easier. Plans to make Latin America resemble Europe and
the United States were foremost on Liberals’ agenda, but they needed money to modernize cities, ports and railroads. Building factories was still unaffordable, so most nations instead developed resources they had at hand and could sell to businesses in more-developed nations. This chapter addresses a period of Indigenous history during which countries in Latin America turned to agrarian capitalism and sold their raw materials to businesses in Europe and the United States. For some people, the resulting export boom produced fabulous wealth, but for others, especially Native people, it generally had a negative impact, as they lost their lands or entered abusive labor arrangements.

Since many Indigenous people still lived in rural areas, they often occupied lands where raw materials grew or were available. Liberal politicians either tried to force Indigenous people to cheaply harvest export products, or else to clear them off the land. Abolishing communal land tenure seems to have been the easiest way for national governments to take over Native lands, though where large prairies were involved, as in Argentina, outright extermination was more direct and left fewer residual people. At the time, no foreigners challenged the resulting genocides, even if they learned of it. Europeans were concerned with Bismark’s buildup of Germany’s military strength and the U.S. was likewise constructing its railway, shipping and telegraph infrastructure. More to the point, at the time politicians in the U.S. were clearing Native people off their own Great Plains. Between 1855 and 1856, the largest tribes on the Northern Plains ceded over 70 million acres of their homelands to the U.S., and over the next decades, the loss of wars forced them to abandon their lands. During these years, the U.S. defeated the Modocs of Oregon and California, Sitting Bull and his Lakota and Cheyenne warriors wiped out Custer’s forces at Little Big Horn, and Chief Joseph led the Nez Percés on their desperate run towards Canada. Warring against Native people in their own country,
politicians in the U.S. paid little attention to Indigenous conditions in Latin America. Besides violence, other strategies for changing Native peoples attempted during this period were missionary work and educational efforts, and Indigenous people responded creatively to both.

Indigenous communities in Latin America also provided labor and soldiering for the Liberals’ economic expansion. As foreign businesses came to control exports of natural resources, the countries who hosted these companies exerted enormous pressure on the producing nations to expedite commerce. Some Latin Americans call this period “neocolonial” because they see resemblances between the export-boom and their earlier colonial relationship with Portugal and Spain, and key social features of colonial interactions indeed persisted. As before, trade was at times also abusive and controlling, and the one-sided benefits did not return to most Latin Americans. Nations in Latin America still focused on trade with foreign powers, though instead of Spain and Portugal, it was now England and France, and to a lesser degree the U.S., which were the growing industrial giants.

However, there were important differences: the “gunboat diplomacy” used by the United States to control resources during this period did not last as long and was not as controlling as Iberian colonial rule. Governments were not in the business of creating long-term colonies, as in settling people from the U.S. in Latin America, rather just focused on extracting resources. Nor were states and companies focused on changing Latin Americans religiously, as the Catholic monarchs had during Colonial rule, though economic interactions often led to the arrival of missionaries from the U.S. Many Latin Americans now admired the U.S. as a growing hemispheric power, where before they had rebelled against Iberian control. Another key change was that the products and their location were different. Instead of silver, gold or textiles in the highlands, businesses used Native workers to harvest crops like coffee, sugar, henequen and
rubber. Rather than force Indigenous people underground into mines, authorities tried to use them in fieldwork or else attacked and tried to clear Indigenous people off their land to make it available for ranching. As states made their resources available for export, this period thus saw widespread Native labor, the defeat of some long-standing armed Indigenous resistance movements, and the incorporation of huge stretches of Native lands into ranchlands.

Indigenous people challenged the Liberals’ establishment of law and order, their systems of forced labor, and the rising threats to Native lands. As nationalism grew in response to foreign influence, power and business, nationalistic leaders took control of Latin American governments, but their neocolonial system mainly favored their upper-class supporters. In Mexico, a massive revolution resulted, and Indigenous people influenced the course of national events. In some cases, politicians employed their nation’s Native heritage to forge powerful nationalistic ideologies of inclusion and unity, a political strategy of integration called *indigenismo*. Many Indigenous people during this time did join national society: missions, labor, education, military service, all changed Native cultures. In a few cases, militant Natives took advantage of national crises to fight for their own goals. More frequently, Natives challenged frontier expansion, foreign intrusions, and threats to their ways of life.¹ National leaders learned throughout that it was increasingly more politically correct and cheaper to incorporate Native people with political strategies and cultural change than to use military force or physical barriers against them. Still, massacres occurred. By the time the Great Depression

¹ This article employs the definition for the term “frontier” provided by Lamar and Thompson: “not as a boundary or line, but as a territory or zone of interpenetration between two previously distinct societies.” See The Frontier in History, 7-8. For further exploration of frontier studies, see Colloway, New Worlds for All, Cayton and Teute, Contact Points, and Otto, Dutch-Munsee Encounter in America.
hit Latin America and new leaders called populists scrambled to rebuild their economies. Indigenous people had become important participants in national events.

**Positivism and Economic Progress Reach Latin America**

By 1870, the Industrial Revolution in Europe had begun to change Latin America. Latin American nations were not yet industrializing, but businesses in Europe and the U.S. required more and more raw materials such as rubber, cotton and sugar for their factories. Liberal leaders met the demand by exporting more of those products. To legitimate their pursuit of prosperity, Latin American elites embraced a philosophy called positivism that was becoming increasingly popular. This social doctrine came originally from French philosopher Auguste Comte, father of sociology, who taught that political order was necessary to achieve progress and economic growth. The growing desire to establish order everywhere, especially on internal frontiers, drove authorities to repress rebellious Indigenous peoples and impose central state authority on Native homelands through military force. The Cruzob, the Mayan people still battling Mexican forces in the Yucatan, serve as a good example: in August and December 1870, they revived their war by twice raiding frontier outposts. Mexican forces could not apprehend them. A Mexican reprisal force of 1,300 soldiers set out in January 1871 to punish the attacks, but entire Cruzob villages simply evacuated ahead of them. The soldiers actually turned back in fear even before reaching the movement’s heartland. The jungle again gave the Maya the advantage. What does the following document, written from the highest leader Cruzob authority, Bonifacio Novelo to their Priestess María Uicab in March, 1871, reveal about the Mayan resistance by this time?

Another place where authorities began trying to impose order on a forested borderland area, at this same time, was Panama. Gold miners heading to California had begun crossing the
isthmus by train in 1855, and mestizos and Afro-Panamanians entered Kuna territory in search of rubber. Then surveyors began to explore sites for a possible canal across Panama. Commander Thomas Selfridge, from the U.S., explored eastern Panama in 1870 with unwilling Kuna guides. They led his scouts through swamps and thickets to the Caledonia pass in eastern Panama, only to discover that the hilly terrain was too high for a canal. The age-old desire to bypass the long voyage around South America would have to wait.

Increasing demands for raw materials during these years led to rising threats on Indigenous lands in Central America. In 1871, Liberal landowner and coffee planter Justo Rufino Barrios took power in Guatemala and pushed what he saw as a golden chance for his fellow elites: coffee. Demand was growing for the beverage in Europe, and Costa Rica and El Salvador were already exporting the beans. Coffee proved a great investment for Guatemalan landowners: when Barrios became president, the beverage already composed 50 percent of exports, and under his rule production soared, doubling by 1876 and then quintupling by 1884.2 With their proceeds, wealthy coffee planters built opera houses, parks, railroads and telegraph lines in imitation of Europe. French and U.S. investors managed Guatemala’s exporting infrastructure, and German immigrants taught efficient ways to cultivate coffee. To harvest the beans, though, planters relied on Native smallholders, and the president changed his nation to increase coffee production.

President Barrios had built a coffee plantation of his own on the communal lands of an Indigenous community in the area of San Marcos, so he knew that Native people tended to be conservative and would resist losing their communal land to coffee plantations and self-sufficient farming to become coffee harvesters. He was also aware that peasants and Native people had led a mass uprising against Gálvez’ previous Liberal reforms back in 1837, as discussed in Chapter
10, so he favored a gradual transition to a coffee economy. The new leader did not initially expropriate all communal properties (by then called censo lands in Central America) and replace them with private holdings, but instead enacted a series of regulations that gradually made more land available for coffee and pressured Indigenous workers to participate in the trade.

Liberal legislation to build the coffee infrastructure in Guatemala gradually severed Indigenous people from the land, their means of subsistence. These measures culminated in 1877, when Barrios issued Decree 170, which finally abolished communal properties for good. The law declared censo lands to be uncultivated terrenos baldíos, the term used for vacant public lands held without formal titles and national property, divided them into individual plots, and then put them on the market at prices fixed by the government. If the renters themselves, usually peasants, did not (or more likely could not) wish to purchase the communal land, anyone could buy it as vacant property. Natives in Costa Cuca lived in one community that lost its censo lands to coffee almost immediately, and others followed over time, especially along the coast. Then Guatemala began to write the conversion of censo lands to individual plots into land titles they issued to villages, so Liberals gradually whittled away at communal lands. Along with coffee, laws opened land for cattle, rubber, chicle and wood. The loss of land to raise food for communities gradually forced Native people further into the market economy.

Besides making more land available for coffee, officials helped planters secure workers for their fincas (coffee plantations) by ordering a state levy that forced Indigenous villages to give planters the number of workers they requested for sixty to ninety days of the year. Laborers migrated from their highlands villages to the coffee fincas in the lowlands to clean the groves and harvest the beans. Conditions were difficult and often violent: Guatemalans called Native workers “chuchos” (dogs), and commonly beat them with fists, whips, machete flats, attacked
them with dogs, and held them in stocks or finca jails. Labor recruiters stole from workers, kidnapped wives and children, and burned their houses down to force compliance.\textsuperscript{5} Planters also secured workers through indebted peonage, a system in which finca managers lent workers money up front to cover expenses and workers remained at the plantation until they paid off their debts. By the 1920s, substantial debts to estate owners burdened most of the men in the Native villages. As a result, highland indigenous people lost the ability to subsist on crops they grew themselves, and became permanent workers on lowland coffee plantations because they had to buy food. The entrance of Guatemala into the coffee market was one of the more brutal in the hemisphere.\textsuperscript{6}

These changes seem challenging, but the transition to coffee and the loss of land varied by community. Historian David McCreery has shown that all these changes affected Indigenous

communities slowly and in variety of ways. For some coastal villages the laws were challenging: in Pochuta, Samayac, San Francisco Zapotitlán and Coatepeque, as David McCreery explained, “coffee hit the local economy and society as a tidal wave, engrossing land and converting local inhabitants into colonos (resident workers) or day laborers on the fincas.”

In the western Guatlemalan department of Quetzaltenango, the new laws furthered privatization of K’iche’ lands, a process that was already underway. The K’iche’ themselves also used the new laws to create individual plots out of communal lands, and landholders registered their properties for titles and purchased their own land. In fact, in this area there was cross-class support within the Native population for privatization. Not surprisingly, an increase in the amount of land cultivated annually was one result of privatization, as well as concentration of land among fewer owners. Communities were changing, yet no major Indigenous uprising followed the privatization because President Barrios had so successfully divided Indigenous from ladino workers in coffee-growing regions and had made the changes slowly. Over the next seventy years, state military and political power gradually broke community self-sufficiency and made Indigenous land and labor available to the coffee growers. Guatemala’s Liberal participation in the coffee market was certainly challenging, but Indigenous people themselves helped to shape and further some of the changes throughout the process.

South and east of Guatemala, extraction of raw materials began to draw Indigenous people into military conflicts. In the early 1870s, mestizos and Afro-Panamanians entered Panama’s southern valleys of Bayano and Chucunaque searching for wild castilhoa rubber. The intruders fought against the riverine Kuna people they encountered in a local conflict called the

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3 In Guatemala, by independence the term ladino referred to a non-Indian, including Spaniards, Mestizos and Creoles. Previously, in the Colonial Period the term had referred only to Hispanicized Indians.
Rubber War. In Bolivia, where seventy percent of inhabitants at the time were Indigenous, Natives joined forces with peasants to oppose Liberal attacks on their communal lands, the ayllus. Mariano Melgarejo, who people called a “barbarous caudillo,” seized power in an 1864 coup and initiated the first state attack to break up Indigenous ayllus. The Aymara responded angrily: in the Bolivian town of Macha, “an immense multitude of ferocious Indians” took over neighboring hills and recovered their ayllus stolen by the President’s family and clients. Finally, a coalition of 40,000 Aymara from highland communities allied themselves with creoles and besieged La Paz in 1870, overthrowing Melgarejo and forcing him to flee to Peru to save his life. The communities mostly recovered their lands from Melgarejo’s cronies and clients, proving the effectiveness of alliances between Indigenous and creole communities who had joined forces in the overthrow. The so-called “Patriarchs of Silver” in the mandates that followed, Presidents Gregorio Pacheco (1884-1888), Aniceto Arce (1888-1892), and Mariano Baptista (1892-96), all owned their own silver mines and opened the nation to foreign capital during their mandates, as if ignoring Melgarejo’s example. The turmoil in Bolivia showed Indigenous reactions to broader changes in the national economy, as local commercial and extractive businesses began to merge with stronger foreign sources to mine tin, silver and other metals. The long-term result was the marginalization of Indigenous communities.

Liberals in Colombia at this time made plans in 1873 to divide up Native resguardos, the communal Native lands in Colombia introduced in Chapter 10, to use them instead for coffee and ranching. Over five hundred Indigenous people, from a coalition of villages in Southern Cauca, joined forces and demanded an end to the project. The mob threatened to side with Conservatives in an armed uprising if the government ignored their claim: “If the mentioned law is put into law or practice, we would find ourselves by necessity standing with the first who gave
the shout of rebellion, as long as they assured us the repeal of the aforementioned law.”

Native people in Colombia discovered that they did not need to actually volunteer to fight, but that only a threat to do so on their part was effective enough to force Liberals to abandon their schemes.

Indigenous people in the Southern Cone still harassed frontier settlements at this time, as pioneers and their cattle settled westward across the plains. Argentine Minister of War Adolfo Alsina came up with one possible –if utopian- solution: in 1875, he ordered a gigantic trench dug for 1,000 km. across western Buenos Aires province to stop Indigenous raiding. Frontier attacks created a sense of urgency that helped to push the project forward: the following year, an Indigenous raid struck just sixty leagues from Argentina’s capital, capturing 300,000 cattle and 500 Argentine pioneers. Under this pressure from Native forces, French engineer Alfred Ebelot designed the trench and workers actually dug the first 374 kilometers in 1878, before hopelessly giving up the project as hopeless. Former president Sarmiento insightfully declared that trying to stop Indigenous people with a ditch was like trying to trap the wind.

Although Argentines hoped to exclude them, some Native leaders reached out to national authorities to negotiate for better relations. One such example Tehuelche Chief Vincente Pincén Calunáu, who wrote to Argentine Colonel Conrado Villegas, in November of 1877, explaining that his troops had begun to raid frontier settlements only after having lost their own lands and families to the whites, but that he and his troops really only wished to be friends with the government and Argentines.

Having failed to stop their raids with an unfinished ditch, and ignoring overtures for peace from some Native leaders, Argentine authorities moved against plains Indigenous people
with force. Legislators debated the wisdom of this approach, because all along their frontier, Argentine pioneers had often joined Indigenous society by choice. In the end, the military hawks won, and made plans for a war that resembled the genocidal programs pursued by neighboring Uruguay and Chile. Minister of War General Julio A. Roca finally led five columns of troops across southern frontiers in 1879 to fight the “Conquest of the Wilderness.” Military forces imprisoned, exterminated or chased the Tehuelche and Mapuche peoples across the Andes to Chile. Natives lost over twenty thousand people in the campaign, including 10,513 elders, women and Indigenous children. To prevent people from fleeing the militia, Argentina closed southern passes to Chile and rounded up surviving Indigenous people onto reservations. Land sales financed the campaign, and following the war General Roca gave 34 million hectares to only 381 ranchers, of whom twenty-four received tracts of 200,000 to 540,000 hectares each.\textsuperscript{13} In response, the general assumed the presidency in 1880.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area Sown to Wheat (1,000 hectares)</th>
<th>Production (1,000 metric tons)</th>
<th>Exports (1,000 metric tons)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
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Source: Ernesto Tornquist and co., The Economic Development of Argentina in the last Fifty Years, Buenos Aires, 1919, 28.

### Argentine Trade with Britain 1870-1889

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<td>1885-1889</td>
<td>2.03</td>
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Source: H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford, 1960, 492-493

As these charts indicate, during the next decades following the Campaign to the Wilderness, wheat production and exports to Great Britain shot up in Argentina as formerly Native lands fell into export crop production.

Frontier development in the Western Hemisphere thus drew Indigenous people into national events. As settlers in the U.S. also moved west onto the prairies during this same period, turning them into farmland, the use of fertilizers for agriculture increased rapidly. One of the best sources of nutrients for crops was seagull dung, called guano, which had been found in great quantities in the 1860s along the steep Pacific coasts of Peru and Bolivia. Soon Chilean mining corporations were paying Bolivia for the right to extract guano from the dry Atacama Desert. As the prices Bolivia demanded for these rights rose, Chilean troops occupied the Pacific port city of Antofagasta in February 1879. Bolivia and Peru then declared war against
Chile. After two years of fighting, Chilean troops finally took Lima in 1881, but a messy struggle of attrition made the War of the Pacific drag on for another two years.

Indigenous people from all three nations participated in this war, on different sides. Native peasants in Peru’s central highlands provided the foundation of resistance against occupying Chilean forces, and in Cajamarca, they fought alongside the landowning elite “in defense of a common interest they termed Peruvian.”

Mapuche warriors, despite their long history of hostility towards outsiders, surprisingly volunteered to fight alongside of Chilean forces. By 1879, over 900 Mapuche had volunteered for active duty and were grouped into a force called the “Arauco” Battalion and heralded as heroes as the “sons of Lautaro,” the Reche leader featured in Chapter 5, who had fought against the Spanish in the Sixteenth Century. Other Mapuche donated significant funds to the war effort. Surprisingly, given their history with Chile, some Mapuche saw military duty as a way to further their own territorial and personal goals. These desires included mainly recognition of their tribal lands and recognition of their distinctive ethnic identity and vision of and desire for a pluralistic, inclusive nation, at a time when their lands and cultures was under increasing attack by the Chilean State. Other Mapuche contributed funds to the war effort: Don Pedro Millaleo and Don Juan Quilamán each gave twenty pesos, an important amount in 1879, to help Chile purchase a warship. In Peru, as Florencía Mallon has shown, Indigenous peasants fought invading Chilean forces in Junín, the central highlands, and in Cajamarca, where they joined to defend a common interest they termed Peruvian.

As Chile and Argentina extended their frontiers, Mexico began its own Neocolonial expansion. The leader who made this possible was General Porfirio Díaz, who took power in 1876. The new president had been born in 1830 to a family of mixed heritage in Oaxaca, where
his father had worked as a miner, blacksmith, tanner, and finally an innkeeper. His mother was part Mixtec and had raised her sons as devout Catholics. After entering the seminary of Oaxaca and serving a brief chaplaincy, Díaz began to study law while Benito Juárez was governor of the state. Later Díaz joined the Oaxacan Liberal Party and became a freemason, which provided him with a network of political supporters. The ambitious young man first entered politics in 1855, when he joined a movement that ousted President Santa Anna. The following year, Díaz became captain of the infantry in the Oaxaca National Guard, and later became famous during the wars against the French.

Having the presidency as his personal ambition, Díaz’ tried repeatedly to win the position by campaigning on a platform of no-re-election. He was defeated in the elections of 1871 and then rebelled unsuccessfully against Benito Juárez. When Juárez died from a heart attack in July of 1872, Chief Justice Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada succeeded him. Lerdo de Tejada, who became one of Mexico’s most successful leaders to date because of his diplomacy, tariff reforms and the addition of a Senate to Mexico’s Legislature. Lerdo announced his plan to run for a second term in 1876, however, so Díaz campaigned against him on a platform of effective suffrage and no-re-election, using as a platform the ideals of the Reforma. Backed by some Texas capitalists, Díaz then mobilized troops and defeated federal forces in the state of Tlaxcala, occupying Mexico City and taking power in November of 1876.

Porfirio Díaz used a heavy hand to rule Mexico over the next third of a century and implement a neocolonial state. The new president was supported by regional caudillos, the military, Liberals angry with Juárez failures and Texas landowners. While Díaz did step down in 1880 to allow a friend to run the country and honored his own initial commitment to no succession, he returned in 1884 and resumed heavy-handed control of Mexico until 1911. Díaz,
the supposed champion of legality and no-re-election, became one of the longest-lasting dictators in Latin American history. To maintain the peace necessary to achieve economic progress, he ruled by the mantra of “bread and stick”, rewarding supporters and clubbing opponents into submission with the Rurales, a force of hired thugs and bandits that kept order through violence. Using a corporate system that controlled and coopted the army, church, landowners and foreign business interests and prevented them from joining forces in opposition, Díaz achieved impressive growth in mining, oil, manufacturing and transportation. Companies from abroad invested heavily in Mexico, laying railroads, building steelworks, mining copper, gold, zinc and lead, as well as exporting sugar, rubber, tobacco, henequen and bananas. Companies from the U.S. and Britain managed oil production, while French and Spanish business controlled Mexico’s textile and consumer goods production. The problem was that foreign companies largely remitted their profits without reinvesting in Mexico, leaving its lower classes uneducated and impoverished. Throughout the long regime, the dictator converted nearly one-fifth of Mexico, 389 million hectares of untitled land, into private property, an area roughly the size of California. Land became a commodity to be bought, traded and accumulated, and values rose steeply due to agricultural demand and rising prices. The concentration of land in the hands of large landowners grew worse under Díaz, and Native and peasant conditions in rural areas deteriorated, even as national exports grew rapidly.

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4 A good source on foreign interests during the Porfiriato is John Mason Hart’s Revolutionary Mexico.
Although Mexico’s foreign trade increased dramatically, Díaz almost immediately faced conflicts with Indigenous peoples. The Mayan *Cruzob* rebels in the Yucatan, who still followed the directives of their speaking cross, proved troublesome to his regime. By this time cross spokesperson Aniceto Dzul was writing to British authorities in British West Honduras (today Belize), trying to convince them to support the Cruzob. Meanwhile, on the western Sierra Madre ridge that ran north through Zacatecas and Durango to Chihuahua, mountain Apache attacked and devastated the towns of Carrizal, Galeana and Laguna. The new regime divided Indigenous people against one another by recruiting Tarahumara warriors to defeat Apache resistance at Tres Castillos and Casas Grandes in 1880.\(^5\) Despite their support of the government, though, the only payments cooperative tribes received were the negative effects of economic development:
by the 1880s, railroads crisscrossed sacred Tarahumara places and smoke blocked the sunlight as new tracks brought in miners and settlers. Barbed wire, installed by ranchers to privatize their land and protect their cattle, threatened Native grazing, watering and woodcutting. The Tarahumara faced dispossession and exploitation, even by their own caciques. Some Natives continued to join uprisings against the new regime, however, and even on the coastal lagoons of Chiapas, so-called “bad Indians” joined outlaws and smugglers to fight the rurales, military police forces that Díaz sent against them. The fact that security forces referred to these people only as “bad Indians”, rather than by their ethnic identity, speaks to both their prejudice and to the possibility that on the borderlands, people of different backgrounds no longer identified with a specific tribal designation.

It was also during these years that the Yoeme (who some outsiders refer to as the Yaqui) in the northern state of Sonora began to organize in earnest against Mexican authorities. Their leader was José María Leyva, a Yoeme drifter born in Sonora in 1835, who had first tried his luck among the yori (whites) along with his father in the 1849 California gold rush. With their earnings he learned to read and write Spanish in a private school. In 1854, Leyva was drafted into the San Blas Battalion of the Mexican army to fight against his own people, who were in open rebellion. The young soldier received his own company and served first in Mexico’s War of the Reforma provoked by Juárez’ Liberal reforms. Then Leyva fought against the French occupation forces of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of Napoleon I, who had arrived at the invitation of Mexican Conservatives to rescue the Catholic Church from the Liberals. Due to his notable service, in 1872 the Governor of Sonora appointed Leyva as Alcalde Mayor of the Yoeme to help subdue and pacify his tribe. As he interacted with his own people from his new post, Leyva became aware of the Yoeme’s “indomitable” desire to keep their independence; a
growing awareness that eventually turned this man around. The trooper deserted the Mexicans and returned to his people, becoming known by 1875 as Cajeme --he who does not drink--, the famous leader who directed the Yoeme war against the Díaz regime.

Cajeme found the Yoeme divided. To unite them behind his plans to rebuild the tribe, he revived the practice of communal farming, which had been discontinued in recent decades as ranchers took over Native lands in Sonora. Inspired, his people declared: “God gave the Yaquis the [whole] river, not an allotment each,” and Cajeme’s new guerrilla forces sought refuge in the mountains. In Mexico, the 1870s were generally a period of growing peasant resistance to regime expansion: Natives in Tamazunchale also mounted an agrarian revolt against ranchers, but Yoeme resistance in Sonora became the most serious opposition to Díaz’ hegemony.

Northern Sonora was at the time an increasingly disputed area: thousands of soldiers from both Mexico and the U.S. had for years been pursuing and fighting the Apache, led by Geronimo, in Northern Mexico and often on Yoeme territory. The defeat of the Apache warriors occurred in 1886, even though individual Apache groups continued to harass settlers. Their demise opened the way for Mexico to declare the Yoeme homeland vacant (terrenos baldios) in this case a reference to the Yoeme territory. Once declared vacant, Mexico sold the land along the Yaqui River in Sonora to railroad companies and ranchers, who bought up huge properties of formerly Native lands: the Torres family purchased 400,000 hectares and the Richardson Construction Company of Los Angeles bought up 547,000 hectares. The Díaz government intended the sales to turn the landless Yoeme into submissive ranch workers, but his plans backfired and instead forced them, under Cajeme’s leadership, into effective guerrilla resistance.
Joining forces with the neighboring Indigenous Mayo people, Cajeme built up his people’s forces against outside pressures and in effect pushed to reclaim regional autonomy for the Yoeme. During the 1870s, he began a guerrilla war to evict the Mexican ranchers and colonists from the United States who were buying up their so-called *terrenos baldios*. Cájeme stockpiled weapons and his forces raided haciendas, stole supplies, and burned Mexican pueblos to the ground to push the invaders out of Yoeme lands.

**Two Decades of War and Creative Economics Alter Native Peoples: the 1880s and 1890s**

As frontiers expanded across Latin America, the last decades of the eighteenth century saw increasing clashes and contacts between settlers and Indigenous people. The United States during this time was mopping up its own operations against Native Americans on the Great Plains, and some Latin American nations followed similar policies. In Mexico, by late 1881 the governor of Sonora had declared a state of emergency in response to Yoeme raids and was unsuccessfully battling Cajeme’s forces. The Yoeme example inspired the neighboring Mayos people of Cuirimpo, Navojoa and Tesia, in Western Sonora, to also reclaim leadership of their own pueblos.¹⁹

In the Southern Cone, it was precisely during the waning years of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) that Chile was finally able to occupy the Mapuche homeland of Wallmapu. Rather than thank its Mapuche volunteers, Chile took advantage of the war to crush Native resistance and take Mapuche land. While the war occupied Chilean troops in the north, colonists flooded Wallmapu, where they founded the city of Temuco in 1881 deep in Mapuche territory. Sixty enraged Mapuche chiefs finally met in March of that year, and coordinated plans to resist the invasion. The result of their parliament was a general Mapuche rebellion in November, when
several thousand warriors attacked Chilean towns, besieged forts and laid waste to ranches on Indigenous land. Chile, though, was at the time mobilized for war and had no patience for a Native uprising that distracted from its northern efforts; reinforcements from Santiago with modern weapons crushed the rebellion Mapuche within a few weeks and a huge toll of Native lives. Troops relocated survivors from their homes to impoverished lives in urban centers or onto reducciones, forced settlements throughout the countryside. Soldiers even took children from Mapuche families and gave them to Chileans, who raised them as servants. The so-called 'Pacification of Araucania', essentially Chilean military occupation, lasted until 1883 and forced the end of significant Mapuche military resistance to Chilean encapsulation.

Even as Chile warred against its Indigenous population in the south, other states also attacked Native populations during this time of increasing interest in their natural resources and expanding internal frontiers. In Argentina, officials extended their war against the plains peoples with a campaign against Indigenous people in the northern scrub forests. General Victorica, Minister of War, led six columns into the Chaco and defeated Qom resistance in May of 1883 at Napalpí. Argentine forces killed chiefs Juanelrai, Yaloshi, Cambá and Meguesoxochí, taking control of an area slightly smaller than the U.S. state of Washington.20

Bolivia also launched an expedition against the Qom and other Chaco peoples living within their borders in 1883. To buttress their campaign, officials recruited Chiriguanos, who were experienced brick-makers from the Franciscan missions, to help construct forts in the Chaco. One such artisan in high demand was José Yandori, and when the brick-maker was not paid enough for his work by the Bolivians, he escaped to the Bolivian settlement of Caraparí, near the southeastern Bolivian border with Argentina. Skilled workers were scarce, though, so a missionary actually tracked Yandori down, had him arrested for desertion and sent back to the
fort. In the end, Yandori fell ill and thus escaped the heavy work regimen.\textsuperscript{21} The experience of this skilled Chiriguano brick-maker shows how officials relied on Native laborers for frontier settlement, and that even amidst the violence, economics and labor at times drew nationals and Natives together.

Even while using force to clear Native people off their lands, some authorities still encouraged mission proselytism to mold Indigenous cultures into national ways of life, a strategy as old as the Spanish Conquest. Paraguay still related differently to its Native peoples: rather than warring against them as Argentina was doing, Paraguay allowed Anglicans to open a mission for the Enxet people at Makxawaia in the Lower Chaco in 1891. With government support, missionaries began trying to change Indigenous cultures to turn them into agricultural peasants and workers for ranches in Paraguay’s lower Chaco Region.

Most governments, in fact, by this time actively encouraged religious proselytism in hopes of further changing Indigenous cultures to conform to national cultures. In Bolivia, by 1892, eleven thousand Chiriquanos lived at Franciscan missions. The last major Chiriguano uprising and massacre, in fact, were related to the missions. A young man named Machirope, who had lived at a mission as a child, began in 1892 to rally Indigenous people against the Bolivians. Calling himself Tumpa, meaning ‘God come to earth,’ or ‘beneficial spiritual being,’ Machirope received the title of tribal chief and treatment as a deity. Chiriguanos eager to reestablish independence fled the missions and joined Tumpa’s rebellion in January 1892, attacking the city of Santa Rosa with 1300 warriors and destroying both missions and ranches. Bolivian forces put down the uprising with savagery, burning to death at least six hundred Chiriguanos who were hiding in caves and then executing another 500 rebels by cutting their throats.\textsuperscript{22} The savage repression of the Chiriguano in the Bolivian Chaco, which came only two
years after the Wounded Knee massacre on the Pine Ridge Lakota reservation in South Dakota, likewise effectively brought an end to armed Indigenous resistance.

The violence spreading across Latin America’s frontiers brought nationals and Native people into greater contact than ever before, often in surprising ways, and writers at the time reflected on this experience. During the 1880s, coastal plantations in Peru began to employ labor drafts to draw thousands of highland Indigenous people down to harvest cotton. To illustrate rising contacts with Native people, a writer from Cuzco named Clorinda Matto de Turner wrote the novel *Birds without a Nest* in 1889. This book features a romance between a white man and an Indigenous woman to explore the results of a mixed society, highlighting the poor treatment of Andean Native people by authorities. Through her novel, Matto de Turner criticized Catholic abuses (the same priest had fathered both lovers), encouraged better nutrition for Native people, and oversight of local officials to prevent abuses in domestic service and debt peonage. The book noted Andean handicrafts, Native beliefs, music and ceremonies, as well as creole adoption of Quechua words, dress, foods and décor. The president of Peru praised the book for stimulating needed reforms. The novel is an early example of a literary genre called *indigenismo*, which glorified historical Native cultures, as in the Inca Empire, but still hoped to see contemporary Native people integrated into national society through education and literacy in Spanish. The *indigenismo* genre spread quickly throughout the continent, but its popularity did not change the exploitation of Native peoples during the neocolonial sale of resources. As a case in point, the very same year that *Birds Without a Nest* was published, Peruvian entrepreneur Julio César Arana created a business to sell *caucho*, rubber latex, from the eastern jungles. Years later, Arana merged with British interests, and his company became known for violent abuses of the Native people who did the hard work of harvesting the *caucho*. Both Matto de Turner and
Arana used Native people to further their own goals, although rubber extraction proved much more brutal in the long-run than writing novels.

As we have seen, during the last decades of the century, Indigenous people in some nations faced increased violence as neocolonial extraction grew. Other Liberal governments realized that minimizing rural violence would attract more domestic and foreign investment. Guatemala was such a place, and leaders realized that violence was counterproductive to order and progress. In addition, Native villages produced most of the nation’s food, so they were to some degree necessary to keep alive. Indigenous people likewise had learned that violent responses on their part usually led only to further repression and were thus counterproductive, so many turned to alternate nonviolent venues to express their frustration. Liberal governments crushed Communities that did rebel violently, such as the village of San Juan Ixcoy in 1898. After neighboring ladino militias tried to take over this village’s communal lands in 1898, the Mayans expelled the surveyor, set fire to the cabildo building, and tried to kill the rest of the ladinos in the village. The next day, militias from surrounding towns arrived and killed an unknown number of Mayans, sending sixty more to trial in Huehuetenango. Their violent response had backfired.

The Mayas learned from such disasters. As coffee production spread slowly throughout the 1890s in Guatemala, then, Native uprisings became less violent. Some individuals fled to other fincas, towns, or even into Belize or Mexico for refuge. Others sought legal solutions. Entire towns took conflicts over properties to court and disputed schemes by landowners to take their properties. The judicial system produced better results because pressures on lands were more gradual by this time, and because landowners offered them printed titles to lesser properties in exchange for their traditional claims to larger, untitled communal lands. Legal disputes took
more time, but were a less violent compromise between Native people and the coffee growers who relied on Indigenous labor to make a profit. Over time, legal venues became more effective ways for communities to defend their lands, and proved less likely to bring repressive forces down upon the village, so by the end of the century violent Indigenous uprisings had gradually disappeared in Guatemala.  

In Guatemala, then, coffee slowly occupied Native lands; other commodities similarly challenged Indigenous communities elsewhere during the export bonanza. On the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, booms in rubber (1860s-1870’s), mahogany and bananas (1880’s), and minerals (1890’s) had turned Bluefields into an important trading center. North American businesses replaced the British interests. This change proved unfortunate for the Miskitu, who had thrown their support behind the British, their longtime allies against first the Spanish and then the Nicaraguans. The growing export market on the coast attracted the attention not only of U.S. businesses, but also of Nicaraguan leaders, who invaded coastal Native territories in 1894. To add foreign leverage to their territorial claims, the Miskitu pled with Queen Victoria in March to assist them in recovering their autonomy. In their words, “We will be in the hands of a government and people who have not the slightest interests, sympathy, or good feeling for the inhabitants of the Mosquito Reservation; and as our manners, customs, religion, laws and language are not in accord, there can never be a unity. We most respectfully beg…your Majesty…to take back under your protection the Mosquito nation and people, so that we may become a people of your Majesty’s Empire.” The British Vice-Consul ignored the Miskitu missive because London had instructed him not to become involved in the dispute. Growing U.S. investments in the coastal economy during the opening years of the Gunboat Diplomacy Period, as well as American interference in the Miskitu council, explain British hesitation to
become involved. North Americans at the time saw the Miskitu council “dominated by Jamaican negroes so inefficient, ignorant and unequal to keep pace with the growth of the place that they were greatly dissatisfied.” As a result, to control growing business interests, U.S. businesspersons infiltrated and took a controlling role in the Miskitu council. Failing to secure foreign leverage, the Miskitu allied themselves with Creoles and rebelled, reinstating their council and preparing for an attack from the Nicaraguans.

In August, 500 Nicaraguan soldiers retook Bluefield without any opposition from U.S. and British forces. The coastal region was renamed Department of Zelaya, after Nicaragua’s president, and officials sent Miskitu Chief Clarence, who opposed the incorporation, into exile. Then they formed a compliant local government, alienated from the Miskitu population, which accepted annexation of the coastal region into Nicaragua. In November of 1894, eighty Native headmen met with the governor and signed a Reincorporation Decree, drafted in advance, that turned their land and autonomy over to the state. There is little doubt, argues anthropologist Charles Hale, that Native leaders acted against their will and in the belief that they had no other choice. Forced incorporation brought taxation, state military presence, and new threats to Miskitu land from Nicaraguan entrepreneurs.

Indigenous people played a more violent role in a liberal rebellion the following year in Ecuador. Leaders from three major Native communities summoned over ten thousand Kichwa to help Liberal leader Eloy Alfaro and his Afro-Ecuadorian troops take the towns of Guamote, then Chimborazo, and finally march to Quito in 1885. Natives’ knowledge of local terrain and transportation of munitions and provisions were critical; in fact, communities cheered “el indio Alfaro” as his troops left for Quito, and Kichwa used the ethnic marker to show their acceptance of Alfaro as leader of their uprising. Their support also shows that rather than always opposing
Liberal rule, Native peoples were more interested in specific promises than in giving blanket support to particular parties.

While Ecuadoran politicians were strengthening their forces with Indigenous support, Southern Cone leaders were still trying to clear Natives from their borderlands. Argentina suffered an economic crisis in 1889 because it had left the gold standard and was printing too much paper currency to fund railway construction and pay off its foreign debt. Once the economy improved, though, Argentine troops returned to exterminating Indigenous people, this time in the southern Chaco. Beginning in 1897, General Lorenzo Winter spent four years pursuing Qom and Mocobí resisters south of the Bermejo River. A series of punitive scorched-earth expeditions in 1898 slowly defeated Qom resistance, which had persisted tenaciously despite the massacre at Napalpí. Soldiers burned Native settlements, killed resisters, and destroyed Native political organization in the Chaco. The slaughter of hundreds of Qom during Winter’s campaign also resembles the massacre of Miniconjou Sioux in South Dakota, only eight years before.

A New Century and Rising Indigenous Participation in National Events, 1900-1910

At the turn of the twentieth century, investors and businesses rushed to take advantage of the great export boom of raw materials sweeping Latin America. Brazilian coffee, Argentine wheat, Cuban sugar, Chilean guano and Bolivian tin purchased new opportunities for elite landowners and foreign companies. The first decades of the new century grew worse, though, for much of the population, especially for Indigenous people. Besides wealth disparity, labor and living conditions made Native situations difficult. Indigenous people continued to see venues for redress in spiritual leaders and messianic movements, political lobby, and, in extreme
cases, participation in violent social revolution. The arrival of the new century then, was for Native peoples the new turn of an old cycle and continuing story of challenges.

Indigenous people in Mexico faced the brunt of the development of natural resources during this time, while Porfirio Díaz enjoyed the apex of his power. The Yoeme in Sonora had divided by the turn of the twentieth century: some worked in the central valley surrounding the capital city of Hermosillo, but the so-called *broncos*, (wild) Yoeme, were hiding in the eastern mountains, part of the Sierra Madre Occidental Range. They vowed to die before giving up their lands and attacked the ranches moving into their territory, even the U.S. ranchers growing vegetables for the California market on former Native lands. Yoeme resistance became an important rural stumbling block to Porfirio Díaz’ plans for development, so federal troops rounded up the Yoeme and deported them to hard labor far away in the Yucatán. Federal forces butchered women and children with Mausers (semi-automatic guns) and tortured prisoners for information until 1908, when a downturn in the Mexican economy cut demand for Yoeme labor. Expropriations were also common in the lowlands, where Mexican and foreign entrepreneurs fenced off communal Indigenous prairies and woods, limiting grazing, watering and woodcutting. As state officials developed the land, some Native caciques became wealthy *rancheros*, owners of moderate haciendas who appropriated communal lands and added to inequalities in Native communities. In Temosáchich, for instance, Tarahumara Cacique Encarnacion Quesada took over most of the communal lands belonging to his people, leaving them without pasture for their flocks. These leaders allied themselves with the Díaz regime and began to dispossess and exploit their own people for personal gain. To the north, the Tarahumara experienced similar desertions by leaders and joined with mestizos in the so-called
serrano rebellions, protests by Native peoples who lived in the hills, against their turncoat leaders.

Finally, President Porfirio Díaz, now firmly in control of Mexico for over twenty years, decided once and for all to end the long-festering Caste War rebellion by the Cruzob, that had destroyed so many sugar plantations in southern Yucatan. Growing demand for baling twine, made from henequen fibers and used even by farmers in the U.S., had turned the peninsula into a huge plantation of henequen cactus. Díaz entrusted the campaign against the Maya rebels to his crony Ignacio Bravo, a methodical general who used twenty-four battalions, the Yucatecan National Guard, repeating rifles, and five cannons to crush rebel forces. After a drawn-out campaign, General Bravo finally accepted the Cruzob surrender at Chan Santa Cruz in early May, 1901. With the long war over, the Cruzob retreated to inaccessible swamps. Rapid development of the peninsula followed as their former lands became the new Federal Territory of Quintana Roo.

The incorporation of borderland Native territories by national governments seemed to be happening everywhere. Another great example occurred in Nicaragua. The Indigenous Sutiaba people, who lived on the Pacific coast northwest of Managua, appeared by this time to be on the brink of extinction. Numbering only 8,500 in 1890, they owned a plot of large communal land west of the Ladino town of León, and only the elders anymore still spoke their own language fluently. The tribe was divided internally along Native lineage groups. Collectively, though, the Sutiaba provided the main political opposition to the ruling alliance of Liberals and Conservatives who ran the town, so the Ladinos had a reason to see them disappear. More importantly, the Sutiabas’ collective ownership of land irritated the town’s elite, who dreamed of taking over the plot. At their demand, Liberal President José Santos Zelaya divided up the
Sutiaba’s communal land in 1902 and distributed it to private cotton and sugarcane plantations. Without it, authorities believed, the Indigenous people would disappear and become ladinos. Later that same year, Congress formally abolished the community of Sutiaba. The measure should have finished off the dying Native group, but they made a surprising comeback: the group fought the privatization in court and held together as a community.33

On the Atlantic side of Nicaragua, other Native people faced similar pressures for integration. The Miskitu again receiving a cold shoulder when they sought British support against still more Nicaraguan pressures to join Ladino society. In 1906, their leader Sam Pitts organized an armed movement and declared himself the Miskitu king. In response, President Zelaya again extended Nicaraguan hegemony over the coast with his Reincorporation Decree and parcelled out huge grants of land to his supporters. Using British leverage, the Miskitu still inside the old reserve fought for and received collective land titles. While they lost much of their ancestral land, the Sutiabas and Miskitu continued their fight even after Zelaya fell from power in 1909. The examples from Nicaragua show that some peoples successfully defended their lands against Liberal attacks.

Southeast along the isthmus, during this time, separatists in Panama took advantage of Colombia’s brutal War of a Thousand Days and finally declared independence from their larger eastern neighbor in 1903. In this civil war, started in 1899, Liberals accused Conservatives of rigging elections to stay in power. Falling world coffee prices aggravated the situation because Colombia’s exports of the beans had slumped. As the violence spread west into Panama, child soldiers figured prominently in the conflict. Finally, the United States pressured the parties to negotiate out of its own growing interest in a canal and the need for peace in the region. The Kuna figured as important negotiators during Panama’s push for independence, because their
territory lay between both countries, and they both courted Kuna allegiance. Indigenous leaders divided over which nation to support, Colombia or Panama, and changing tribal leadership finally helped sway their decision towards Panama.

About that time, a Kuna man named Charly Robinson became an influential tribal leader. Robinson had earlier been adopted and educated by an English-speaking sea captain named Charles Julius Robinson, from a Caribbean island claimed by Colombia, who took Charly to sea. The young sailor visited ports along the Caribbean and Atlantic before returning to Nargana, the main Kuna town, where he married and opened a store. Robinson eventually started an English school and then was chosen head chief by the Kuna, but his efforts to modernize the people through schooling were soon dwarfed by U.S. interest in digging a canal. In 1907, Panama attempted to change Kuna culture by sending a zealous priest named Leonardo Gassó to the coast, a Catholic missionary veteran in Mexico and Ecuador, but the Kuna’s opposition and their Anglo-affinity doomed his efforts. The Catholic mission collapsed five year later, and the Kuna instead received a Protestant mission. The U.S. demand for stability and order, however, which was central to its plans to dig a canal, soon had an impact on Indigenous peoples that dwarfed Panama’s efforts to change Kuna culture religiously.

In the Andes, the demand for Amazonian rubber had grown to a new height during these years, and in 1907 Julio Arana, the Peruvian rubber entrepreneur, registered his business in London. Henry Ford had founded his Motor Company in 1903, and discovered that his automobiles ran best on tires made from Latin American rubber. Arana’s Peruvian Amazon Company began meeting the demand. Capitalized at £1,000,000, Arana’s company began to employ brutal measures to force the Huitoto people in Peru’s eastern forests to harvest the caucho, rubber latex. Even if they had been paid for their hard work, the Huitoto were self-
sufficient in their forest homes and had no need for cash. To secure a passive labor force and force the Natives to work for free, company managers began to use brutal tactics. Within a few years, rumors of abuses led the British Foreign Office to send Councilman Roger Casement to investigate. Casement was an Irishman with previous experience investigating neocolonial extraction. In 1890, he had traveled to the Congo during the Belgian rubber boom, where he met Joseph Conrad, author of *Heart of Darkness* and witnessed the shockingly brutal treatment of the population under Belgian King Leopold’s rule. Casement spent seven weeks in Peru in 1910 and, in his report, accused Arana’s company for extracting 4,000 tons of caucho at the cost of 30,000 Native deaths. He found that the company used torture and terror to force the Huitoto to work. The rubber boom in Amazonia brought wealth to some during this period -- in Manaus, on the middle Amazon, where Ford was extracting *caucho* at this time, rubber barons even built a famous opera house to entertain themselves-- but led to untold misery to thousands of Native people. These practices were becoming more common throughout Latin America; a similar example was taking place in eastern Paraguay, where the Guaraní harvested yerba mate for the Paraguayan Industrial Company under dismal conditions of debt peonage. The laborers who made such export booms possible did not enjoy benefits from the profits.

**Indigenous People and the National Agrarian Revolution in Mexico: 1910-1911**

As Latin American leaders struggled to unite their nations behind the exportation of raw materials, they faced a popular backlash against the labor abuses and foreign interests that came to dominate much of the commerce. Most nations did not develop internally, and their industries had not grown as leaders had hoped. People in the middle and lower classes had suffered and
their levels of comfort had even declined, causing growing anger against the elite and foreign businesses. Competition over raw materials pushed nations to defend their resources and borders. Intensified hostility between states led to a rise in nationalism throughout Latin America, occurring at roughly the same time as European nations formed alliances and armed themselves before World War I. Growing numbers of urban middle-classes, including millions of newly-arrived western European immigrants to Latin American countries along the Atlantic, were eager to improve their lives. To unite their growing population behind common goals of strength and prosperity, new nationalist leaders built on popular images of Indigenous virility and racial uniqueness, as well as their pre-European presence in the Americas. Their strength, nationalistic leaders argued, had helped to forge unique, strong nations throughout the continent.

The collapse of the long Cruzob rebellion in 1901, a conflict that had dominated late nineteenth-century Mexico, actually heralded the Revolution of 1910 because the deteriorating Mayan conditions illustrated how the long Díaz’ regime had made lower-class poverty and political influence progressively worse. After Díaz’ army defeated the Cruzob, landowners in Yucatan extended commercial agriculture and political control at the expense of small and communal landholders. Elite racist attitudes only made things worse: by this time many saw rural peasants as “machines that run on pulque (beer)”, and contemptuously joked that “Indians only hear through their backsides.” Rulers hoped to kill off the Yoeme people because they stood in the way of national progress, meaning that their way of life and communal landholding obstructed capitalist development.37 Once-independent peoples in many places lost control of both their political autonomy and ownership of production, as haciendas and even caciques tied to the regime took charge. A depression in 1907-1910 raised the cost of beans and maize, and
Native people and peasants were infuriated; Mexico was at an explosive stage. By 1910, Indigenous people throughout the country were ready to risk lives to improve their situation.

Although Indigenous anger did not spark the Mexican Revolution, Native people quickly joined the uprising; their participation was important because one third of all Mexicans suffering under Díaz’ rule were Native. By 1910, the dictator had ruled for thirty-four years and his health was ailing. The year before, a wealthy rancher from Coahuila named Francisco Madero had begun calling for a political transition. Madero demanded an end to the genocidal wars against Indigenous people and the repression of labor strikes, and suggested moderate concessions to workers and peasants to decrease social tensions and the proliferation of radical ideas. Plenty of examples gave the Mexican elite pause for thought: labor and political troubles in China, Russia, and the US at the time were distant rumbles, but there had also been so many struggles at home in Mexico that landowners greatly feared the potential of radical reforms upsetting their own position. Madero saw democracy as a way to control the masses by granting a few reforms and education and dissipating their growing anger. Disaffected caudillos not tied to Díaz eagerly joined Madero to oppose the dictator. In Chihuahua, a mule driver named Pascual Orozco and Pancho Villa, a bandit, led a rebellion in 1910 that took most of the state from federal troops. Indigenous people in the mountainous state of Morelos, who had long fought against encroaching sugar plantations, joined a mestizo named Emiliano Zapata to fight against President Díaz. Throughout the year, uprisings broke out everywhere in the country.

Change was in the air, and Natives rose throughout Mexico. The Huastecas, along the eastern coast in the State of Hidalgo, rebelled in the regions of Tancanhuitz and Tantoyuca only days after Madero issued his revolutionary manifesto in November, 1910. Díaz rushed in rurales forces to crush the uprising, but violence spread quickly to neighboring Tantima, Tamazunchale
and Chicontepec. American observers quickly noted that these Native rebellions bore little resemblance to Madero’s moderate goals: “It seems,” wrote one, “that the repression of many years has resulted in a reaction, hastened by the disturbed conditions elsewhere, that no ordinary terms of peace can stop, and that there is a danger of a prolonged period of reprisal and accounting.”

Events bore out these fears. Early on, Mexicano teenagers Domingo and Cirilio Arenas marched from bases on the Malinche volcano and burned the railroad station at Atlixco. In the West-Central states of Jalisco and Michoacán, popular Native struggles to bring about agrarian reform --a process called agrarianism-- broke out independently of official anti-Díaz movements. Social bandit Domingo Magaña took up the cause of landless Indigenous people in western Tabasco and, like the fabled Robin Hood, stole from Spanish merchants, raided plantations and freed the peasants.

Madero’s conservative plans for an ordered political transition, though, soon got out of hand: by May, 1911 bands of armed Indigenous people were attacking landowners in much of the country, claiming that lands had once belonged to their ancestors, and that “Madero promised we should have them, without having to pay.”

Indigenous people were pushing Madero’s revolution from below, a very scary prospect for Mexico’s elite, even those who had hoped to overthrow Díaz. In 1911, the dictator finally sailed off to retire in Paris and Madero became president.

Different Approaches to “Taming” Indigenous People, 1911-1912

While Mexicans saw Indigenous people join their social revolution and Argentines tried to kill Natives off, Brazilians had been completely preoccupied with how to move ahead without African slaves. They adopted a nonviolent way to integrate Native people. Leaders had finally
abolished slavery in 1888 because of British pressure and then declared a Republic. The economy shifted from sugar to coffee during the Neocolonial Period and then, in 1906, Brazil opened direct steamship service to New York City. While these changes indicated the nation’s transition from the colonial past to a modern future, they also altered the lives of Indigenous people. As the economy changed, German immigrants and Brazilians flooded the cities to work in factories and the interior to farm. In the southern state of Santa Catarina, forest Indigenous people violently opposed the invasion of their lands by settlers. In the state of São Paulo, workers laying railroad tracks clashed with Native people. The growing conflicts set off the discussion that was becoming so common throughout the continent: “What do we do with the Indians whose lands we want?” The director of São Paulo’s state museum argued that “Indians” were savages and should be removed from the path of civilization by force. A very different idea came from an army engineer named Cândido Rondón, who had relied on Native help when he had extended telegraph lines through the Amazon forest to Bolivia. His argument for protecting Natives and attracting them to civilization by material assistance won, in the end, because it was cheaper than military action and coincided with nationalistic and Romantic literature of the day, but also because it allowed Brazilians to show off their progressive goals. The government created a new agency in 1910, the Service for Indigenous Protection, to clear Indigenous people peacefully from the path of development. However, the agency was poorly funded, and all the peoples that it contacted by the 1920s, including the Aimoré, Kaingang, Kagwahiva, Umutina and Urubús, were within a few years decimated or completely eliminated by diseases.

In Panama, Protestant missionaries were also trying a nonviolent way to change Native cultures. Invited by Chief Robinson, Adventist missionary Anna Coope opened an English Bible school on Nargana in 1913, replacing the failed Catholic efforts to convert the Kuna and make
them live like national farmers. Although Coope was warm, good-humored, and Kuna flocked to her school, she attacked what she called their “heathen” cultural traits. The new missionary criticized the women’s use of alcohol, colorful clothing and beads, arguing that Kuna women were vain and “made of the same sinful tendencies” that she saw in women everywhere.\textsuperscript{41} To this missionary, the “other” was basically the same, whether in Panama or back in the U.S. In a matriarchal culture like the Kuna had, however, a misogynist approach quickly made enemies.

Then, in 1915, Panama’s President Belisario Porras visited the Kuna territory of San Blas, posted police and opened Spanish schools on the islands of Tupile, Nargana, Nusatuputo and Playon Chico to launch a state program to change and integrate the Kuna. Police posts were added, allegedly to protect the Panamanian teachers. Inevitably, conflict with Coope’s mission resulted when authorities found that she was dissuading students from attending their state schools, because she had built new schools herself and was trying to attract Kuna students. Police ended her efforts in 1919 and placed her under house arrest, preventing her from teaching and allowing her to teach religion only at night and on Sundays.\textsuperscript{42} Such limits kept her from daily interaction with Kuna children. Education by missionaries, and then by state teachers, proved a difficult way to change the Kuna.

**Further Indigenous Participation in National Revolutions, 1912 - 1917**

In Mexico, by this time, the revolution drew in more and more Indigenous people and was not at all yet trying to “tame” them. After deposing Díaz, Madero proved a disastrous president, and revolts against him rocked the nation. Both the government and rebels relied on Indigenous forces to augment their troops. During the summer of 1912, Madero recruited Yoemes, Mayos, Pimas and Pápago in Sonora, and 500 more acculturated serranos from Oaxaca, and sent them all to fight rebels in Chihuahua.\textsuperscript{43} Many Indigenous troops also joined the
revolution against the government, out of conviction, protesting that under Díaz, life “was all reprisals, outrages and abuses without limit.” Such testimonies help explain why some Natives risked their lives to fight in the civil war, but soldiering experiences also altered Indigenous views and ways of life.

All sides in Mexico’s civil war continued to draw on Indigenous people as workers and soldiers, but additionally in hopes that service would change their worldviews. Rebels capitalized on Native contributions. In the State of San Luís at Palomas, the Cedillo brothers, who were rancheros (moderate hacienda owners), attracted Native fighters during March of 1913, by offering to return to them the lands “despoiled by the Porfirista bandits.” These bandits were thugs who had worked for Porfirio Díaz. The landowners just laughed at them, however, believing the threats worthless. To some onlookers, though, the violence seemed chaotic; the US consul at Veracruz wrote home in the summer of 1913 to explain that the Indians did not seem to care who was president, “if only they can gain the liberties their ancestors enjoyed. Sometimes they cannot tell for what principle they are fighting. Nevertheless, their raids are not made in a spirit of lawlessness; abuses exist and the realization that they have suffered too long makes a reaction in such an extreme form seem lawful to this people.” Indigenous people, then, fought both for and against the national government. Notably, some Yoeme served the state as troops even though they had earlier mounted such a tenacious resistance movement against Díaz. Cooperation presumably provided worthwhile benefits, such as promises of land and an end to state persecution, to some Native people.

As the regime grew desperate to repress new rebellions, it revived the Porfirian practice of Indigenous impressment—forcing Natives to join the army. By mid-summer 1913, President Victoriano Huerta’s recruiters were hunting the Puebla sierra, southeast of Mexico City, for
soldiers to add to federal troops and impressing Native people into the army. This forced conscription set off a new wave of protests and a week of fighting on the sierra.\textsuperscript{47} Abuses like forced military service commonly provoked lawlessness: Indigenous bands pillaged local merchants, took advantage of villagers, extorted guns and drank to complete intoxication to protest serving against their will. The government also impressed and then moved Native troops from one side of the country to another as a way to divide Indigenous peoples; conscripted Mayans arrived in Mérida by the trainloads to join federal forces. An entire battalion posted in Yucatan was composed of impressed Yoeme from far-away Sonora. Yet conscripted Natives did not submit easily: on Puebla’s sierra and in Veracruz, opposition to forced conscription pushed even formerly peaceful communities into angry resistance, and detachments commonly mutinied, deserted, and murdered their officers out of resentment at being forced to serve.\textsuperscript{48} Conscription worsened Indigenous conditions within the dire situation already caused by the revolution.

Economic and political tensions also drew Indigenous people into national events elsewhere in Latin America. Between 1913 and 1916, Liberal factions in Ecuador fought each other in a civil war known as the Concha Rebellion, in which followers of former Liberal leader Eloy Alfaro rose up to protest his assassination in 1912. President Alfaro had drawn Native people into national events, which helps to explain why his followers risked their lives in anger over his death. Some Indigenous people had supported Alfaro’s rise to power because he had confiscated church-owned properties; Natives considered him as one of their own and claimed him as a “\textit{runa} who desired that we all lived equally,” employing the Kichwa term for human being, \textit{runa}, to show that Alfaro belonged to them, which is why they were angry at his murder. Fewer Indigenous people fought in the rebellion than did Afro-Ecuadorians, because Liberals considered Natives to be childlike, incapable of political participation, and too inferior to be
soldiers, and therefore excluded them from joining their forces. Some Indigenous people who did join the army, during the rebellion, did so to escape the debt peonage and forced labor that they faced at home. Other Natives in the government forces were recruited because Ecuadorians were too afraid of the Afro-Ecuadorian rebels to serve. Even if they volunteered, Native people were still targets of discrimination by Ecuadorians. Government soldiers riding in trains through the northern highlands on their way to fight revolutionaries in the province of Esmeraldas, for instance, drunkenly fired into Native houses and at Indigenous field workers as they passed, killing Natives and their animals, in the belief that Indigenous people supported their opponents.

Following the rebellion, four Liberal presidents served until 1925, during which coastal landowners and commercial bankers controlled Ecuador and continued the neoliberal exportation of cacao until the Great Depression. Indigenous people made few visible gains for having fought on both sides of the failed Concha Rebellion, except for possibly achieving a greater collective awareness of a shared Native identity that later supported their political participation in national events.  

Revolutionaries in Mexico, in what was a much larger civil conflict than in Ecuador, continued to use Indigenous people to augment their troops, and Natives served in order to improve their local situations. Venustiano Carranza presided over Mexico between 1914 and 1920, institutionalizing the revolution in the new 1917 National Constitution. Some Indigenous people supported Carranza, claiming he had “freed them from the slavery in which they had always lived,” yet his rule was predatory. Extortions under the new president occurred far more frequently than reforms: corrupt officials speculated on food sales, supposed railway escorts stole from passengers, and military forces even seized municipal funds. Crime and banditry was rampant. Mexico’s national leaders understandably regarded the Indian rebellions that took
place during this revolutionary time with fear and suspicion, and repressed them when possible. To build mass nationalism in a country recently torn apart, but without actually sharing their power with the masses, politicians realized they would need to employ the upheaval that followed the toppling of Díaz to harness and pacify lower-class mobilization. Governors began promising to distribute state land to Native groups, as a way to “bind” Indigenous people to the nation state, tame their activism, and indebt them to the Revolution through propaganda, education and agrarian reform.\(^5\) Having employed Native soldiers in their armies, revolutionary leaders began trying to coopt and tame Indigenous participation in the revolutionary process; to paraphrase a popular idiom, they now wanted to put the Indigenous genies back into the bottle.

The Yoeme broncos, though, refused to submit and return to their place. They continued to fight Carranza’s government and pushed authorities to take action. Six thousand warriors, women and children in their valley, using the store of arms left from their participation in the revolution, pressed for self-government on tribal lands. The Yoeme had sustained themselves by living off of mescal bulbs and fortified in the mountains, and were not easily vulnerable to attack. By 1916, they had renewed their guerrilla sorties against Mexican settlements. The Yoeme continued to make these raids for another ten years, until the revolutionary state, which had no place for ‘independent tribal enclaves’, finally clubbed them into submission in the battle of Cerro del Gallo in 1927. Only through total surrender could the Yoeme expect to keep some of their lands.

At the same time, the Yoeme saw small bits of their patrimony integrated into what became the Mexican revolutionary celebration of the country’s Indigenous heritage through a political strategy called indigenismo, (explained below in a textbox, and not to be confused with the related literary genre by the same name discussed earlier in this chapter). Economic decline
made such political ceremony more urgent, as a political strategy to unite the national population during the difficult years after the divisive revolution. One example of the downturn occurred in Veracruz, when in 1921 the oil boom began its rapid decline, putting thousands of Huastecs out of work. Military turmoil and economic decline made it necessary for Mexico’s leaders to try new political strategies to put their country back together.

State Hegemony and Lingering Indigenous Resistance between 1920 and 1930

During the Interwar Period and the worldwide Great Depression of the 1930s, Indigenous people across Latin America responded to further frontier expansion through both violent resistance and nonviolent integration with national societies. Born out of increasingly desperate conditions, both approaches were creative responses to a changing world. In some cases, it was Native people themselves who initiated and perpetuated the violence as ranchers developed internal frontiers in countries such as Argentina. Along its swampy northern border with Paraguay, just south of the Pilcomayo River, Argentina built Fort Yunká in 1917 as one of several outposts intended to monitor the frontier and keep the local Pilagá from harassing new cattle ranches. On March 19, 1917, Pilagá warriors led by Chief Garcete attacked the fort and killed fourteen Argentine soldiers, women and children. The attack provoked a reprisal and further settlement of the region.

Nations with larger and recently mobilized Indigenous populations, meanwhile, devised political strategies to suppress Native activism, especially where wars had energized Native people to express their frustrations with specific poor conditions. Peruvians blamed their defeat in the War of the Pacific on the nation’s failure to integrate its Indigenous people; the threat of caste war seemed imminent because of their large Native population. Peru’s populist President
Augusto Leguia (1919-1930) sought to create a strong central state by reaching out to the Indigenous people and middle class.\textsuperscript{54} Peru’s new constitution of 1920 promised protection to Natives, and the 1922 Patronage of the Indigenous Race decree promised legal defense of their rights. At the same time, however, another law obliged Indigenous Andeans to build roads without pay, revealing the program’s ambiguity.

In Mexico, Indigenous participation in the revolution had been even more anonymous; many Natives had fought, but except for the Yoeme, they had often done so as angry peasants instead of as members of a specific Native people. Elite politicians like Manuel Gamio therefore designed \textit{indigenismo} as another “white/mestizo” program to resolve the “Indian problem,” a way to assist the “poor and suffering race” … “achieve their liberation.”\textsuperscript{55} Natives were objects of this racist strategy, not its creators, actors, or benefactors. \textit{Indigenismo} became a method of national political control in many countries, and dominated relations between Natives and national governments for the first half of the twentieth century.

Some Indigenous people, meanwhile, showed their firm desire to remain in control of their own territory and means of production despite state overtures. In 1921, Panama finally took a hard line on “civilizing” the Kuna, who by then had moved to fifty villages on little coral islands along 150 miles of the Atlantic coast. For three years, police carefully patrolled the islands and to try and changed the people, detained Kuna who disobeyed their orders by continuing their own cultural practices. They targetted women wearing nose rings or short hair, or bathing in puberty rituals, and placed them in stocks or even in jail. The Kuna used deceit, flight and especially noncompliance with official orders to fight these mandated cultural changes. Forced integration continued until February of 1925, when they finally rebelled. Armed with shotguns and rifles, the Kuna painted themselves bright red for war, took over four
islands, and put the police to flight. With U.S. oversight, Kuna elders and Panamanian authorities finally met aboard the U.S. cruiser Cleveland and negotiated a treaty under which the Kuna gained limited regional autonomy and the removal of state police forces. In neighboring Colombia, Native leader Manuel Quintín Lame, the “chief, representative and general defender” of seven Páez cabildos (municipal regions), during this time organized his people, known as the Páez or the Nasa, to demand land rights and even push for their separation from the nation state. Lame also participated actively in the Communist Party to gain added leverage, and successfully elevated Natives to positions of authority within the party. Under his direction, the Nasa sought to distinguish themselves from the state and defend their lands.

In northern Argentina, meanwhile, the remaining Indigenous people resisted the invasion of their lands by stealing cattle and attacking frontier forts. Authorities tried to “concentrate” them onto reservations to clear them off the land and force them into debt peonage on sugarcane plantations. Desperate, the Native people followed messianic leaders who promised better times and the expulsion of the “whites,” but drought and hunger made their situation even worse. Throughout 1922 and 1923, police assassinations of Indigenous people created an atmosphere highly charged with fear and anger. Indigenous religious leaders encouraged the assassination of settlers and mystically promised that bullets would do no harm. After ranchers and police tried to force them to pay off their debts to plantation stores, the angry people danced religiously in search of a solution. Their movement resembled the Ghost Dance on the Northern Plains of the U.S. On July 19, 1924, one hundred and thirty settlers and policemen surrounded the Mocobí community of Napa’lpi, in Chaco Province, and methodically shot down over forty men, women, and children with bolt-action Mauser rifles. Security forces cut up the dead with machetes, saving only penises and testicles as trophies. In the wake of this massacre, Mocobí leader
Cacica Dominga Mercedes, from Quitilipi, negotiated with the national authorities, encouraged her people to show loyalty by saluting the flag of Argentina, and held her communities together. Seen by some as a sell-out, Mercedes realized that dialogue with Argentines was the only way to keep more of her people alive. The demand for labor to produce export commodities and the resulting disputes had again proven deadly for Indigenous workers.

Other conflicts followed as export production continued. Three years later, in southern Bolivia, one of the largest Indigenous rebellions of the twentieth century broke out in Chayanta province, northern Potosí, when ten thousand Aymara rose in revolt against the expansion of haciendas onto their ayllus (traditional communities). On 25 July 1927, Natives attacked hacienda houses, destroying gardens and orchards and killing cattle to express their anger. Rebels used mock Bolivian trials, the cannibalistic consumption of a dead hacienda owner, and even his ritual sacrifice to their mountain deity to express their hatred. Authorities killed hundreds of people with machine guns to end the uprising. Though defeated, the uprising ended the extension of haciendas onto community lands and forced the removal of corrupt local officials.57 During this time in Nicaragua, liberal patriot Augusto Sandino still fought against occupying U.S. Marines and National Guard forces in the last years of Gunboat Diplomacy. Given their traditional Anglo affinity, one might expect that Native Miskitu forces would have sided with the foreigners. Under the impact of the worldwide economic depression after 1929, though, as conditions deteriorated and export businesses left the country, a surprising number of Natives helped Sandino’s forces oppose the occupiers. The rebel leader courted their support, establishing schools and agricultural support, and providing health care for Miskitu along the upper River Coco.58 Sandino’s efforts to improve Native conditions won their allegiance and
some peace as Nicaragua, along with Indigenous peoples and other nations, headed into the worst years of the Great Depression.

Conclusion: Native Resistance, Exports and Frontier Expansion in Neocolonial Latin America

During the neocolonial years of the late nineteenth century, Indigenous people faced Liberal administrations intent on moving them out of the way of economic development. The Liberals wanted land, resources and labor to harvest lucrative export crops such as coffee, rubber, bananas and henequen, so in areas of larger Native populations and histories of racial mixture they divided communal territories, took the land for agriculture, and created a pool of landless workers. Loss of land and strenuous labor conditions created difficulties for many Indigenous people. In societies without an historical place for Native inclusion, leaders warred against Natives to clear them off ranching land. Proselytism and education were less-violent ways to force Indigenous populations into national society, and Native people responded creatively to these state programs. At times, they joined together to present common fronts and defeated attempts to take over their lands. In response to new strategies of integration, some Indigenous people joined national society. Others firmly opposed internal frontier expansion, foreign intrusions, and changes to their traditional ways of life. By the time the Great Depression hit Latin America, Native people were more involved than ever in national events.

While Indigenous people were divided in their response to Liberal attacks, they employed political alliances strategically to counter outside threats. Rather than always opposing Liberal rule, Natives were more interested in specific political policies, even if their allegiance at times resulted in accommodation. Sometimes they signed treaties against their will as ways to appease
threats. In other cases, compliance and cooperation proved viable alterNatives to costly violent resistance, and communities employed judicial courts to address local grievances. Other times, Natives also participated in wars to further their territorial claims and gain recognition as citizens. Some Native groups defended lands against Liberal attacks successfully, and many thousands of Indigenous people fought in the Mexican revolution, pushing for improvements to local grievances from below. Native resistance provoked military reprisals and even drastic measures like a trench for physical separation. Although they assisted in frontier development and at times supported political changes, Indigenous laborers usually saw few visible gains beyond greater collective consciousness and ethnic strength. Even peaceful contacts still resulted in decimation by disease. A few peoples negotiated treaties for limited regional autonomy, or even sent leaders to key positions in national administration and politics. In most places, Native peoples instead sought to distinguish themselves from the state and defend their lands. By the time the Great Depression struck with full force, Indigenous communities throughout Latin America had been shaped by and were helping to influence national events.

1 Reed, The Caste War, 208.
4 Williams, States and Social Evolution: Coffee, 61.
5 McCreery, “Hegemony and Repression,” 164.
9 Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala, 111.
10 Hylton and Thomson, Revolutionary Horizons, 51.
14 Mallon, “Nationalist and Anti-State Coalitions, 233, 234, 244.
16 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 1, 118-120.
18 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 1, 111.
23 Favre, “The dynamics,” 255.
33 Gould, *To Die in This Way*, 117.
35 Taussig, “Culture of Terror,” 474.
39 Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, V. 1, 224.
47 Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, V. 2, 55.
49 Foote, “Experiences of Military Struggle,” 87, 100, 102.
51 Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, V. 2, 373.
55 Knight, “Racism, Revolution, and Indigenismo,” 77.
56 Cordeu and Siffredi, *De la algarroba*, 89.