Supplementary Information

Pictures for the Trophy Mug and the Ice-cream Rewards

Note 1: Nash Equilibrium in Reward Treatments

If subjects place sufficient pecuniary value on the rewards, then it is easy to see that positive contributions could be consistent with Nash Equilibrium in reward treatments. Any such pecuniary effects would be identical between reward treatments and thus cannot explain between treatment differences.

Table 1: Determinants of Approval Received

Random Effect GLS	
Ice-cream	-2.613* (1.427)
Mug	-2.753 (1.706)
Ice-cream x Others Avg. Contribution	1.021*** (.120)
Mug x Others Avg. Contribution	0.821*** (.139)
Baseline x Others Avg. Contribution	0.882*** (.093)
Baseline x Positive Deviation from others' average	0.999*** (.095)
Mug x Positive Deviation from others' average	0.726*** (.168)
Ice-cream x Positive Deviation from others average	1.041 (.119)
Baseline x Negative Deviation from others' average	-1.287*** (.090)
Mug x Negative Deviation from others' average	-1.053*** (.109)
Ice-cream x Negative Deviation from others' average	-1.312*** (.107)
Constant	5.174*** (1.141)
Period Dummies	Yes
# of Obs.	1520

Note: Dependent variable: Approval Points i received in period t
Random Effect GLS regression, robust standard error clustered by group
Level of significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Note for Table 1(SI) :

Table 1 shows that determinants of approval points received follow a similar pattern across the treatments. In particular, the greater (smaller) the contribution in relation to others, the greater (smaller) was the amount of approval a person received. The strength of this effect is identical

among treatments. This is shown by the coefficient for "Treatment variable (Baseline/Mug/Ice-cream) x Positive/Negative Deviation from Others' average." Moreover, in all treatments, the group's highest contributor is also a star winner with frequency at least 90%.

Table 2: Dynamic Contribution

	Random Effect GLS	Random Effect Tobit
Mug_male	5.657***	14.479***
	(2.049)	(5.376)
Mug_Female	1.369	6.931
	(2.215)	(6.301)
Ice-cream_Male	1.175	6.245
	(2.157)	(4.977)
Ice-cream_Female	0.778	7.420
	(1.659)	(5.065)
Baseline_Male	.943	3.208
	(1.261)	(4.105)
Approval Points Received	.201***	.286***
	(.030)	(.050)
Male in Mug x Others Avg. Contribution	.324***	.819***
	(.088)	(.200)
Female in Mug x Others Avg. Contribution	.635***	1.277***
	(.111)	(.288)
Male in Ice-cream x Others Avg. Contribution	.339***	.492***
	(.113)	(.224)
Female in Ice-cream x Others Avg. Contribution	.490***	0.793***
	(.085)	(.239)
Male in Baseline x Others Avg. Contribution	.502***	.991***
	(.092)	(.174)
Female in Baseline x Others Avg. Contribution	.580***	1.284***
	(.061)	(.225)
Constant	4.203***	-1.340
	(1.235)	(3.859)
Period Dummies	Yes	Yes
# of Obs.	1368	1368

Note: Dependent variable: Contribution of i in period t, independent variable in period t-1.
Random-effects GLS regression, robust standard error clustered by group
Level of significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Note for Table 2 (SI): Female Conditional Cooperation and Male Unconditional Generosity.

First period contributions between *Mug* and *Ice-cream* are statistically identical among female co-operators (N=12 for *Mug*; N=15 for *Ice-cream.* z=1.001, P=0.317); within *Mug*, however, significant differences emerge between female co-operators' (mean=14.0, N=12) and male co-

operators' in the first period (mean=17.4, N=29, z=-2.356, P=0.019). Nevertheless, over time in *Mug*, female co-operators' (N=7 groups) contributions increase so that overall average contributions do not differ between male (N=12 groups) and female co-operators (N=7 groups) (z=-0.466, P=0.641). Table 2 provides evidence to support female conditional cooperation. We see that the coefficient for female conditional cooperation in *Mug* is 0.635 (z=5.72, P=0.000), which is significantly higher than 0.324, the coefficient for male conditional cooperation in *Mug* (chi2 (1) = 6.94, P=0.008).

Table 3: Allocation of Approval Points

Random Effect GLS	(1)	(2)
Cooperator_Mug	6.505**	4.584*
	(2.905)	(2.359)
Cooperator_Ice-cream	5.684**	4.229*
	(2.471)	(2.533)
Free-rider_Mug	4.908*	
	(2.731)	
Free-rider_Mug_Male		1.897
		(2.479)
Free-rider_Mug_Female		7.347***
		(2.592)
Free-rider_Ice-cream_Male		-1.527
		(1.614)
Pos. Dev. from Others' Avg. Contri in Mug	-.690***	-.451***
	(.225)	(.126)
Pos. Dev. from Others' Avg. Contri in Ice-cream	-.598*	-.494***
	(.311)	(.163)
Neg. Dev. from Others' Avg. Contri in Mug	-.008	.032
	(.225)	(.180)
Neg. Dev. from Others' Avg. Contri in Ice-cream	.282	.269
	(.191)	(.139)
Constant	7.796***	15.613***
	(1.055)	(1.235)
Period Dummies	Yes	Yes
# of Obs.	1040	1040

Note: Dependent Variable: Approval points assigned by persion *i* in period *t*
Random GLS regression with robust standard error clustered by group.

Note 2: Classification of Co-operators and Free-riders

Each subject is classified as either a Free-Rider or Co-operator. To do this, we first define a decision as cooperative if the contribution for the current period is at least as great as the mean (rounded down to the nearest integer) of the subject's group members' contributions from the previous period. A subject is classified as a co-operator if the majority of her nine classifiable decisions (from periods 2 to10) are cooperative; otherwise, she is classified as a Free-Rider.

Note 3: Controlling for Group Effects

To control for group effects, each type in each group is associated with a single observation, as follows.

For the Approval Points: Each observation is calculated as the overall average of approval points assigned by each type in each group. For example, suppose a group has two female free-riders and two male co-operators. This implies two observations, with each type's observation equal to the average approval points assigned by that type.