Lecture 23: The Cold War: Political Developments; Economics and Business; End of Cold War; Decolonization

HISTORY 1130:
Themes in Global History:
Trade, Economy, and Empires

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A. Cold War Timeline
B. Cold War: General Pointers
C. The Arms Race and Business of Cold War
D. Kennedy and the Cold War
E. End of the Cold War: Theories
F. Decolonization
A. Cold War Timeline

1. Negotiation 1945
   Yalta - The Cold War Begins
   Outline notes for the First Year of the Cold War

2. Demonstrations 1946
   The Nuclear Arms Race
   Outline notes for Truman 1946

3. Containment 1947-1949
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   Outline notes for Containment
   Venona
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   Outline notes for Dean Acheson 1949-50
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   Outline notes for Kitchen Debate 1959
   Outline notes for JFK and the Search for Friends
   Outline notes for JFK and the Search for Peace
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5. Detente 1968-1980
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   Outline notes for Ford 1974-76
   Outline notes for Carter 1976-80
   Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik

   The Arms Race Renewed
   Outline notes for Reagan 1980-84
   Ronald Reagan Home Page
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   Outline notes for Reagan 1985-89
   Mikhail Gorbachev from EGO Russia Guide
   Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed 12/8/87
   Arms Control treaties from FAS

   The Triumph of Solidarity
   Mazowiecki wins Poland's 1st free election 6/89
   Hungary opens border 10/89
   East Germany opens Berlin Wall 11/9/89
   Ceausescu executed in Romania 12/25/89
   Vaclav Havel president of Czechoslovakia 12/29/89
   Lithuania votes independence 3/90
   Germany unified under Helmut Kohl 10/90
   August coup fails & CIS replaces USSR 12/91
   Outline notes for Bush 1989-93

9. Aftermath
   Outline notes for Clinton 1993-2001

*How to Do Cold War History:
http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/guide/guidehome.html
*Origins of the Cold War:
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B. Cold War: General Pointers

- According to the conventional view, the Cold War was a conflict between two superpowers, caused by Soviet aggression, in which we tried to contain the Soviet Union and protect the world from it.

- On the Soviet side, the events of the Cold War were repeated interventions in Eastern Europe: tanks in East Berlin and Budapest and Prague. These interventions took place along the route that was used to attack and virtually destroy Russia three times in this century alone. The invasion of Afghanistan is the one example of an intervention outside that route, though also on the Soviet border.

- On the US side, intervention was worldwide, reflecting the status attained by the US as the first truly global power in history.

- On the domestic front, the Cold War helped the Soviet Union entrench its military-bureaucratic ruling class in power, and it gave the US a way to compel its population to subsidize high-tech industry. It isn't easy to sell all that to the domestic populations. The technique used was the old stand-by-fear of a great enemy.

- The Cold War provided that too. No matter how outlandish the idea that the Soviet Union and its tentacles were strangling the West, the "Evil Empire" was in fact evil, was an empire and was brutal. Each superpower controlled its primary enemy -- its own population -- by terrifying it.
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-In crucial respects, then, the Cold War was a kind of tacit arrangement between the Soviet Union and the United States under which the US conducted its wars against the Third World and controlled its allies in Europe, while the Soviet rulers kept an iron grip on their own internal empire and their satellites in Eastern Europe -- each side using the other to justify repression and violence in its own domains.

-So why did the Cold War end, and how does its end change things? By the 1970s, Soviet military expenditures were leveling off and internal problems were mounting, with economic stagnation and increasing pressures for an end to tyrannical rule. Soviet power internationally had, in fact, been declining for some 30 years, as a study by the Center for Defense Information showed in 1980. A few years later, the Soviet system had collapsed. The Cold War ended with the victory of what had always been the far richer and more powerful contestant. The Soviet collapse was part of the more general economic catastrophe of the 1980s, more severe in most of the Third World domains of the West than in the Soviet empire.

-As we've already seen, the Cold War had significant elements of North-South conflict (to use the contemporary euphemism for the European conquest of the world). Much of the Soviet empire had formerly been quasi-colonial dependencies of the West. The Soviet Union took an independent course, providing assistance to targets of Western attack and deterring the worst of Western violence. With the collapse of Soviet tyranny, much of the region can be expected to return to its traditional status, with the former higher echelons of the bureaucracy playing the role of the Third World elites that enrich themselves while serving the interests of foreign investors.

-Of course, the end of the Cold War brings its problems too. Notably, the technique for controlling the domestic population has had to shift, a problem recognized through the 1980s, as we've already seen. New enemies have to be invented. It becomes harder to disguise the fact that the real enemy has always been "the poor who seek to plunder the rich" -- in particular, Third World miscreants who seek to break out of the service role.
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C. The Arms Race and Business of Cold War
*Review article by Robert Higgs:
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1297

![Graph of real military outlays (billions of 1982 dollars), 1948–1989.](http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1297)
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Fig. 6. Public opinion balance on defense spending, 1949–1989.
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-The Cold War era witnessed a new relation of military activity to the political economy of the United States. Before World War II the allocation of resources to military purposes remained at token levels, typically no more than one percent of GNP, except during actual warfare, which occurred infrequently. Wartime and peacetime were distinct, and during peacetime—that is, nearly all the time—the societal opportunity cost of “guns” was nearly nil. The old regime ended in 1939. The massive mobilization of the early 1940s drove the military share of GNP to more than 41 percent at its peak in 1943-44.

-Despite an enormous demobilization after 1944, the military sector in 1947, at the postwar trough, still accounted for 4.3 percent of GNP, three times the 1939 share. Following the Korean War, military purchases reached an unprecedented level for “peacetime” and, while fluctuating, remained at or above this elevated level ever afterward. During the period 1948-1989 military purchases cumulated to more than $7 trillion (1982 dollars), averaging about $168 billion annually, or 7.5 percent of GNP. The trend tilted slightly upward for absolute real spending, slightly downward for spending as a share of GNP. Increases in the military share of GNP during the Korean and Vietnam wars came entirely at the expense of the private share. The government nonmilitary share increased during the first two post-World War II military buildups and remained approximately constant during the third.

-The high base level of defense spending during the Cold War resulted from the dominant ideology of global anti-communism, which called forth various foreign policy doctrines (e.g., the Truman Doctrine, massive retaliation, the Reagan Doctrine) and military commitments (e.g., NATO, bilateral defense treaties, U.S. military “advisers” in Latin America). The ideology alone, however, was an insufficient prop, and episodic crises played an essential part in maintaining public support for vast military expenditures. The national security elite warned of one “gap” after another, most of which turned out to be exaggerated or nonexistent. Given the secrecy in which much defense-related information was held, it was inevitable that the national security elite would use its unique access to information to promote its own interests, which were sometimes in conflict with public preferences. There were limits, however, and in the political struggles military interests sometimes lost. The authorities could not always effectively mislead the citizenry, especially when many deaths and increasing taxes (including unanticipated inflation) were involved. But the constraints on policymakers, being subject to informational and ideological displacement and responsive to perceived crisis, were themselves elastic and manipulable.
-Findings by e.g. Robert Higgs establish that the financial performance of the leading defense contracting companies was, on the average, much better than that of comparable large corporations during the period 1948-1989. The findings do not justify a normative conclusion that the profits of defense contractors were “too high”.

*Military-Industrial Complex (MIC): see e.g. http://hnn.us/articles/869.html

D. Kennedy and the Cold War

-Throughout his pre-presidential career, JFK was an active Cold Warrior. As noted, his first Congressional campaign boasted of taking on the anti-Cold War faction of the Democratic party led by Henry Wallace, and as a congressman he aligned himself with those who said the Truman Administration wasn't being tough enough.

-One does not even have to rehash his relationship with Joseph McCarthy (the main proponent of the efforts to weed out communism in the USA) to show how JFK willingly played the "tough on communism" issue in all his campaigns. In 1952, while running for the Senate, he proudly trumpeted the fact that during his first term in the House, even before Nixon had won fame for the exposure of Alger Hiss, JFK's work on a labor committee led to the conviction of a communist union official. While in Congress, he supported all of America's overseas activities in waging the Cold War.

-Even while running for President in 1960, JFK appealed to the "tough on the Soviets" issue by consistently hammering at Eisenhower for America's supposed lack of leadership, and America "falling behind the Soviets." It was JFK, promising more money for defense spending and American readiness when he charged Eisenhower for allowing a non-existent "missile gap" to develop between the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. And it was JFK, who during the debates with Nixon, charged that Eisenhower policy had resulted in the loss of Cuba.

-Upon assuming the Presidency, JFK's Inaugural Address was as hawkish as one could ever get. "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we will pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty."
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-As President, JFK, in order to credibly claim he had taken action against the "missile gap," ordered an increase in spending on nuclear missiles that set off an arms race that resulted in America losing its nuclear superiority by the end of the decade. Those who point to the Limited Test Ban Treaty as proof of JFK wanting to begin the first step toward disarmament, should remember that JFK wanted a ban chiefly for environmental reasons, and not because he envisioned the long-term elimination of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it was JFK's own Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara who came up with the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) principle that was dependent entirely on the maintenance of a sizable nuclear arsenal.

-JFK, to be sure, did make efforts to reduce direct tensions with the USSR following the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the installation of a teletype Hot Line was seen as essential to preventing the slowness of communication that had hampered talks during the crisis from happening again. But merely because JFK wanted to reduce direct tensions with the USSR in no way meant backing away from the basic principle of containment first enunciated in the Truman Doctrine. Khrushchev had still publically declared that the Soviets would support "wars of national liberation" wherever they occurred in the world, and since JFK firmly believed in the "Domino Theory", then the idea of backing away from containment was impractical from a national security standpoint, let alone a political one.

-It was for these reasons alone, that holding the line in Vietnam was essential. It was JFK who increased America's troop number from 500 to 16,000 and he repeatedly insisted that while Vietnam might have been "in the final analysis, their war," American troops were nonetheless not there "to see a war lost" and that he totally disagreed with those who were suggesting the idea of a pullout. "I think that would be a mistake," he said to Walter Cronkite in 1963.
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*Vietnam War: Timeline
http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/timeline/

*War Statistics:
- Longest war in US history (11 years)
- "War" was never officially declared by the United States
- A Cornell University study placed the over-all total U.S. cost of the Vietnam war at $200 Billion
- Total U.S. bomb tonnage dropped during:
  - World War II = 2,057,244 tons
  - Vietnam War = 7,078,032 tons (3-1/2 times WWII tonnage)
- Bomb tonnage dropped during the Vietnam War amounted to 1,000 lbs. for every man, woman and child in Vietnam.
- An estimated 70,000 draft evaders and "dodgers" were living in Canada by 1972.
- An estimated 3 million people were killed by the war, and over 1 million were wounded.

Vietnam War - Participants and Casualties
By: Richard Kolb with Tom Campbell and Dick Ecker
Credit: VFW Magazine - June/July 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. hostile deaths by military service</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The 5 Coast Guardsmen are included in the Navy total.

April 1969 - Peak US troop strength - 543,400
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry (includes armor recon personnel)</td>
<td>21,578</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation (helicopter)</td>
<td>1,772</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Service (essentially combat medics)</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor (includes armor crewmen, etc)</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Engineers</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These branches account for 87% of all 30,950 Army hostile deaths
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Figure 3. US Defense Share (=Percentage, ME to Federal Government Outlays) and Military Burden (=Percentage, ME to GNP), 1789/91—1999

Observe the figure above. What comes to mind when analyzing it?
E. Why Did the Cold War End?

How did the Cold War End?

1. In the late 1980s, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev initiated a series of Summit meetings with President Ronald Reagan.
2. Gorbachev's reforms led many soviets citizens to demand more freedoms and an immediate move to capitalism.
3. Throughout the late 1980s eastern European nations had movements against their Communist governments. The Soviet Union did not stop them.
4. Gorbachev and President Bush held a summit meeting at Malta and negotiated important reductions in intermediate range nuclear weapons.
5. Late in 1991 there was a coup in the Soviet Union. Hard line soviet leaders held Gorbachev hostage. He was "rescued by Boris Yeltsin. The Berlin Wall came down and the Cold War was over.
6. The Soviet Union broke up into many smaller ethnic nationalities. Some remained together in a loose confederation called the "Russian Confederation." Boris Yeltsin became the Premier of Russia, a capitalist country with a more or less democratic form of government.
7. The Soviet Union no longer existed and thus no longer controlled Eastern Europe. In 1990 West Germany and East Germany unified.
E. Why did the Cold War End? (cont.)

*What is the traditional view of the why the United States "won" the Cold War?*

1. During the Carter and Reagan Administrations the United States upped military spending.
   - Carter: B1 Bomber and MX Missile system.
   - Reagan: Star Wars (SDI), more nuclear submarines, across the board increases.
2. The Soviet Union spent to try to keep up with this arms race but could no longer afford to do so. They could no longer afford to produce basic consumer goods and the economy and system collapsed.

*What is the less American centric view of the collapse of the Soviet System?*

1.

2.

3.
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Whereas the ideology that informs the opinions of realists from the right is rather amorphous, their premises can be said to revolve around four basic convictions. These assert that the Cold War’s death is essentially synonymous with the Soviet Union’s retreat and fragmentation, which were caused by (1) the West’s preparations for war; (2) its nuclear weapons and its corresponding capacity to deliver assured destruction; and (3) its elaborate alliance system—all of which exerted a powerful impact because (4) the character of the adversary’s ideology, communism, was fatally flawed and only required the ingredients listed above to put it to rest forever.

And here it should also be noted that the Soviet rejection of its allegedly hegemonic aims cannot be attributed to the Reagan military effort to make America “stand tall” by possessing unmatchable weapons. The Soviet retreat from Europe, Afghanistan, and elsewhere occurred well after that military buildup had lost its momentum, and after it became clear that the West’s tough bargaining strategies had failed (Risse-Kappen, 1991). Moreover, “the notion that the arms race in the 1980s forced the Soviet economy to its knees suffers from the problem that the Soviet economy had been in an even worse state in previous phases of the Soviet empire” (Gleditsch, 1993:357), and also from the potential problem that “the defense burden cannot be shown to have increased in the 1980s and thus cannot be shown to link the Reagan military buildup with the collapse of Soviet foreign policy” (Chernoff, 1991:111). Hence, Soviet rapprochement with the West may have had much more to do with other, more potent causes. These catalysts include those internal factors emphasized by liberal theory, such as changes in domestic politics and the leadership changes in the Soviet Union that brought individuals receptive to conciliation with the West into power.
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### How Did the Cold War Die?

#### Table 1. Rival Images of the Causes of Communism's Collapse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Postulated Cause</th>
<th>Proposition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Factors:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The economic burdens of hegemonic competition</td>
<td>“Gorbachev’s cooperative initiatives toward the United States came at a time when the Soviet leadership no longer believed that it was riding the wave of an inevitable Communist triumph in its competition with the West and when the current and potential costs of that competition were weighing heavily on a struggling Soviet economy.” —Martin Patchen (1990:33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A truce necessitated by superpower decline</td>
<td>“The metamorphosis in the U.S.-Soviet relationship was the result of two interconnected factors: a formal recognition by the Soviet Union that to tackle its extraordinary economic difficulties it had to seek a permanent settlement with the capitalist world, and a growing recognition in Washington that to keep the world stable while it addressed its own economic problems (some of the result of Reagan’s policies) a deal with the Soviet Union would be highly desirable.” —Michael Cox (1990:35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemic Communities:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Soviet intelligentsia were “the gravediggers” of communism</td>
<td>“The Gorbachev-era earthquake had fundamental political causes, which were its <em>sine qua non</em>. [But] political factors do not tell the whole story. For while the major mile posts of Soviet reform may have been initiated from above, they received crucial support . . . from below. The Soviet intelligentsia . . . embraced [glasnost] enthusiastically and proceeded to push the boundaries of the permissible.” —Francis Fukuyama (1993:10–11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ideological appeal of liberal democracy</td>
<td>“Many of the demonstrators . . . who sought to reject communist rule looked to the American system for inspiration. But the source of that inspiration was America’s reputation as a haven for the values of limited government, not Washington’s $300 billion-a-year military budget and its network of global military bases.” —Ted Galen Carpenter (1991:37–38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic reformers in Russia</td>
<td>“Russia did not lose the Cold War. The Communists did. . . . A democratic Russia deserves credit for delivering the knockout blow to Communism in its motherland.” —Richard M. Nixon (1993:A17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
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**Leaders and Leadership:**
The individual leader as mover of history

“In just less than seven years, Mikhail Gorbachev transformed the world. He turned his own country upside down... He tossed away the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe with no more than a fable-the-well. He ended the cold war that had dominated world politics and consumed the wealth of nations for nearly half a century. ... The most obvious 'thing that just doesn't happen' in the Gorbachev revolution was Gorbachev himself.”

—Robert G. Kaiser (1992:11, 13)

“[The end of the Cold War was possible] primarily because of one man—Mikhail Gorbachev. The transformations we are dealing with now would not have begun were it not for him. His place in history is secure.”

—U.S. Secretary of State
James A. Baker III (in Oberdorfer, 1991a:A33)

**Tenor of the Times:**
A supportive international environment for political suicide

“The hard international environment of the early 1980s obliged the Soviet leadership to consider change, but tough Western policies alone could not finish the job. Reagan, Thatcher, Bush, and the other Western leaders who dealt with Gorbachev had only limited leverage over him. What they did, in effect, was hand him a gun and suggest that he do the honorable thing. As is often true of such situations, the victim-to-be is more likely to accept the advice if it is offered in the gentlest possible way and if he concludes that his friends, family, and colleagues will in the end think better of him for going through with it. For Soviet communism, the international environment of the late 1980s was a relaxed setting in which, after much anguished reflection, to turn the gun on itself.”

—Stephen Sestanovich (1993:30–31)

**Fortune and fate**

“The Soviet Union, while manifestly in trouble as many observed, was not poised for a collapse, nor was it even in acute crisis. The Soviet Union was viable and probably could have lasted another decade or two, with good fortune a good bit longer; but deeply flawed, it was vulnerable to adverse chance events. Viable but vulnerable, the Soviet Union was hostage to bad fortune. That the invalid did not live, but died at the hands of an unlikely doctor employing untried medicine owed much to chance.”

—Myron Rush (1993:19)
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>Disintegrative pressure from within the communist empire</td>
<td>“The acute phase of the fall of communism started outside of the Soviet Union and then spread to the Union itself. By 1987, Gorbachev made it clear that he would not interfere with internal experiments in Soviet bloc countries. As it turned out, this was a vast blunder. . . . If Poland could become independent, why not Lithuania and Georgia? Once communism fell in Eastern Europe, the alternative in the Soviet Union became civil war or dissolution. The collapse of the Soviet Union might well be called the revenge of the colonies.” —Daniel Klenbort (1993:107)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic Political Factors:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Media publicity of Soviet moral weakness</td>
<td>“It was the moral reassessment of the seventy-odd years of this socialist experiment that shook the nation, not Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars. It was the flood of publications of the Soviet Union’s human rights record and its tremendous distortions of moral and ethical principles that discredited the system, especially when introduced into the everyday lives of its individual citizens through the popular media. This is what focused the drive for change and first made people vote against representatives of the morally corrupt old political elite.” —Vladimir Benevolenski and Andrei Kortunov (1993:100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic dissatisfaction</td>
<td>“Some conservatives argue that the Reagan defense buildup forced Gorbachev to change his policies. And, clearly, the Soviets were concerned about having to compete with U.S. technological superiority. But it seems likely that internal pressures played as much, if not more, of a role in convincing the Soviet leader to agree to measures that cut his country’s firepower more than they cut U.S. strength.” —Carl P. Leubsdorf (1991:D3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure from the grassroots peace movements</td>
<td>“The changes wrought by the thousands of people serving in the trenches [were] essential to events in recent years and at least partially responsible for [ending the Cold War].” —David Cortright (1993:forthcoming)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rise of nationalism in the former republics</td>
<td>“In less than two years, communism collapsed everywhere. . . . The causes [were] the national communities, not social groups or individuals.” —Helène Carrère d’Encausse (1993:270)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- simple model of costs and benefits to a dictator and producer of the command system
- Soviet economy grew along a stable trend for most of the 20th century
- command system not necessarily unstable by nature or could have collapsed at any time
- stability was conditional: the dictator had to be able to offer rewards for participation and acceptance of coercion
- the command system could follow two routes to insolvency: 1) frequent and large economic shocks (unforced or forced surrender of the dictator); 2) lessening of the level of coercion (unforced or forced surrender of the dictator)

### Table 6D.1. Expenditure of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Atomic Energy of the USSR, 1987–90

| Year | Military expenditure (b. current roubles) | GNP (b. current roubles) | Military expenditure as a percentage of:
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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a Includes expenditure on nuclear weapons.

b GNP = gross national product.
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F. DECOLONIZATION:

Decolonization in the aftermath of World War II:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6w8m0DK3hc

Colonial powers in 1945:

In 1920 Mohandas "Mahatma" Gandhi (1869-1948) launched a national campaign of nonviolent resistance to British rule in India. The result was nothing less than a revolution in Indian politics, and Gandhi made Congress into a mass political party with members from every ethnic group. This Indian National Congress poster--The Right Path to Liberty--draws upon Indian culture to build support for nationalism. All Indian communities are marching toward freedom, but Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), and others are in prison, and a bridge has collapsed. Yet the Hindu deity Krishna reassures anxious Mother India: with a little more sacrifice the journey will be complete. (British Library)
Decolonization, background:

Some main points (see your readings for further details):
-long roots, 19th century, impact of world wars, European nations became indebted to their colonies for assistance in the war effort
-new Superpower, USA, idealism of World War II, quickly displaced by Cold War rhetoric and interventionism
-decline of European economies and polities – sacrifice for the common good in the war?
-Third World decolonization processes, especially in Asia, Latin America, and Africa
-violence, instability, power struggles – interference from the Cold War participants
-proxy wars, some times led to bigger conflicts (Korea, Vietnam etc.)
-interference often resulted in authoritarian governments, legacies of conflict
-decades of violence
-also newly-independent states, some of which were and are democracies
QUESTIONS, in writing:

1) 

2) 

3)
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ANY QUESTIONS ON TODAY’S LECTURE?
ANYTHING ELSE?